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ABSTRACT 
The literature on civil-military relations has always focused on democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces.  There is currently a debate in the civil-military 
relations field concerning the amount of military knowledge politicians should possess in 
order to effectively control the armed forces.  While one side argues this knowledge can 
be minimal, the other argues politicians need to have a general working knowledge of 
military affairs.  This thesis attempts to illustrate the differences between political and 
knowledge-based management of the armed forces by examining two case studies: Chile 
and Colombia. 
This thesis also attempts to advance the trinity of civil-military relations, the brain 
child of Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau at the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) 
located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.  Rather than settle for 
democratic civilian control only, the trinity adds two additional requirements to 
successful civil-military relations: an effective and efficient military.  By analyzing the 
trinity and using it as the standard for civil-military relations in Chile and Colombia, this 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is currently a debate in the civil-military relations field concerning the 
amount of military knowledge politicians should possess in order to effectively control 
the armed forces.  While one side argues this knowledge can be minimal, the other argues 
politicians need to have a general working knowledge of military affairs.  However, in 
addition to civilian control of the armed forces, this side further expands the argument by 
adding two more requirements in civil-military relations, military effectiveness and 
military efficiency.  This thesis paper will analyze this trinity of civil-military relations 
put forward by Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau at the Center for Civil-Military Relations 
(CCMR) located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and attempt to 
determine the feasibility of this new concept.  Will this new concept provide a more solid 
foundation for civil – military relations or is civilian control of the armed forces, 
regardless of how it is achieved, enough to ensure solid civil-military relations?  Is it even 
necessary to pursue this new concept that may or may not provide better results?  This 
thesis will attempt to answer this question, as well as other questions raised by this new 
concept.  
Civilian control of the military has always been considered a prerequisite for 
democratic consolidation.  Harold Trinkunas states, “stable democratic rule is impossible 
without civilian control of the military.”1  Regions like Latin America have suffered from 
numerous coups throughout history.  Ideally, had civilian officials exercised proper 
control of the military, these coups may not have taken place.   Civilian control of the 
armed forces helps ensure that military forces do not become involved in internal politics.  
Furthermore, effective civilian control of the armed forces may help improve the armed 
forces themselves.  If a new concept like the trinity of civil-military relations takes hold, 
it could provide civilian officials a roadmap to establish effective civil-military relations 
and ideally improve the professionalism of the armed forces as well as keep them out of 
internal politics.  In today’s globalized world, professional armed forces are crucial allies 
in the United States global war on terrorism. 
                                                 
1  Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela : A Comparative 
Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 2. 
2 
Civil-military relations in Latin America has been a widely debated topic and with 
good reason.  After decades of authoritarian regimes, democratic governments have 
established themselves throughout the region with a few exceptions.  Despite the rise of 
democracies, these regimes have not proven to be as stable as expected.  Peru suffered a 
self-coup by President Alberto Fujimori in 1992, Guatemala experienced an attempted 
self-coup in 1993, Ecuador suffered two coups, one in 2000 and another in 2005.2  In all 
these cases, the military had a part in the coup, either as the cause of the coup, pulled in 
to fill a vacuum as happened in Ecuador or in preventing the coup.  Democracy is a long 
way from consolidation in Latin America, as demonstrated above “stable democratic rule 
is impossible without civilian control of the military.”3  If civilian control of the military 
is necessary for stable democratic rule, how much do the civilians need to know about 
defense issues, if anything at all?  Will more knowledge provide for better civil-military 
relations?  This thesis aims to answer those questions and pose further questions in the 
field of civil-military relations. 
There is a consensus in the literature that democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces means the subjugation of the military to civilian leaders.4  However, there is an 
ongoing debate about how much knowledge civilians should have in defense affairs in 
order to establish strong civil-military relations beyond subordination of the armed forces 
to civilian control.  One side argues that “what Latin America needs are civilians who can 
manage the military in political-, not defense-, oriented terms.”5  The argument is that 
                                                 
2  Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 
(2004), 7-9. 
3  Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela : A Comparative Perspective, 2 
4  There are a myriad of sources discussing democratic civilian control.  See Michelle Bachelet, "Los 
Estudios Comparados y La Relación Civil Militar.  Reflexiones Tras Una Década De Consolidacion 
Democrática En Chile," Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 17, no. 4 (October - December, 2002), 29-
35.; Thomas C. Bruneau, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited," Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1 - 2 (January - June, 2005), 111-131.; Thomas C. 
Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr, "Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America," Military Review 86, no. 
5 (Sep/Oct, 2006), 67.;  Claudio Fuentes Saavedra, "La Transición De Las Fuerzas Armadas," La Tercera, 
sec. Correo, September 22, 2006, http://www.flacso.cl/flacso/ (accessed 16 November 2006).; David Pion-
Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," Military Review 85, no. 1 (Jan/Feb, 
2005), 19.; Marcos Robledo, "Democratic Consolidation in Chilean Civil-Military Relations, 1990 - 2005" 
In Global Trends and their Impact on Civil-Military  Relations (Forthcoming), eds. Thomas C. Bruneau 
and Harold A. Trinkunas.; Mark J. Ruhl, "Curbing Central America's Militaries," Journal of Democracy 
15, no. 3 (2004), 137-151. 
5  Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America, 19 
3 
civilians do not need to acquire knowledge about defense strategy, training, or various 
other related matters as long as they exercise political control of the armed forces.  Pion-
Berlin points out that in Central America “there is a complete absence of civilian defense-
related insight, influence, and expertise, yet military subordination to civilian rule has 
been largely achieved.”6  Furthermore, there is a lack of incentives to become educated in 
defense-related matters.  Whereas United States officials have a keen interest in 
maintaining military installations and defense contracts in their districts, there is no such 
interest in Latin America.  The emphasis of Latin American governments such as those of 
Central America, Colombia, Argentina or Chile is on internal security, the economy and 
social issues, a much bigger problem in most of Latin America.7 
The other side argues that civilian policy makers need to understand defense 
issues but not necessarily become experts in defense related matters.  According to 
Thomas Bruneau, “it is more important that they establish stable institutions that embody 
and perpetuate the expertise needed to deal with possible roles and missions as they 
arise.”8  Harold Trinkunas weighs in on the argument by stating “civilian control by 
oversight exists when politicians and bureaucrats are able to determine policies and 
approve military activities through an institutionalized professional defense 
bureaucracy.”9  Essentially, politicians cannot determine policies without some 
understanding of defense issues.  This especially applies as more Latin American 
countries are developing defense white books.10  A majority of white books in Latin 
America lack substance as a military document and are, in David Pion-Berlin’s words,  
 
                                                 
6  Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America, 27 
7 Pion-Berlin lists these among the many issues detracting politicians from defense issues in Latin 
America.  See David Pion-Berlin and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore 
Defense Policy in Latin America," Latin American Research Review  42, no. 3 (October, 2007), 76-100 and 
Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America. 
8  Bruneau, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited, 121 
9  Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela : A Comparative Perspective, 5-6 
10  For more information concerning white books, see Guillermo Pacheco Gaitán, ed., Políticas De 
Defensa y Elaboración De Libros Blancos: Experiencias Latinoamericanas, 1st ed. (Guatemala: Ediciones 
Legales, 2003), 242.; Juan Ramón Quintana, ed., Libros Blancos De Defensa: Concertación Política y 
Diseño Estratégico Comparado, 1st ed. (La Paz: Editorial Offset Boliviana Ltda., 2001), 251. 
4 
“an exercise in what I call ‘transparent obfuscation.’”11  Nevertheless, civilian officials 
knowledgeable in defense affairs dramatically improve the quality of white books as 
evidenced by Chile’s latest white book.12   
Bruneau further expands the argument by introducing a new concept in civil-
military relations, the trinity of civil-military relations consisting of “democratic civilian 
control, effectiveness and efficiency.”13  This concept establishes a relationship between 
democratic civilian control, military effectiveness and military efficiency.  Military 
effectiveness refers to the ability of the armed forces to implement the roles and missions 
assigned to them by civilian leaders.  Military efficiency refers to achieving those roles 
and missions “at the least possible cost in lives and resources.”14  In order to assign 
relevant roles and missions to the armed services, civilian leaders need to have some 
knowledge about defense affairs.  A lack of knowledge in defense affairs can lead 
civilian leaders to assign roles and missions that cause the armed services to become 
involved in missions outside the purview of military forces, such as law enforcement 
missions resulting in poor relationship between law enforcement and the military and a 
diminished trust between the military and civilian leaders.   
This trinity of civil-military relations is a relatively new concept in the field of 
civil-military relations and raises the standard on what constitutes true civil-military 
relations.  As such, there is scarce literature on the subject.  However, this paper will 
examine the concept of the trinity and apply it to a real-world scenario.  Although there is 
strong evidence of successful subordination of armed forces in several Latin American 
countries despite the lack of defense knowledge, the trinity of civil-military relations may 
further solidify civil-military relations in these countries.  If this concept becomes the  
 
 
                                                 
11  Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America, 30 
12 For an overview of Chilean white book development, see Pacheco Gaitán, Políticas De Defensa y 
Elaboración De Libros Blancos: Experiencias Latinoamericanas, 29-77 
13  Bruneau, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited, 122 
14 The definitions of military effectiveness and efficiency are drawn from Bruneau, Civil-Military 
Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited, 123 
5 
standard by which civil-military relations are measured, civilian leaders will have to 
develop some knowledge about defense affairs in order to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their armed forces.   
In order to determine the viability of this new concept, this paper will examine 
two Latin American countries, Chile and Colombia.  The trinity will be put to the test 
using Chile’s democratic transition as a case study.  Chile is a unique case since the 
military controlled the initial stages of the democratic transition.  Despite their control 
however, Chile has developed a fairly robust defense administration and is widely viewed 
as one of the best in Latin America.  Due to Chile’s unfortunate history, civilian leaders 
within Chile have been forced to interact with the armed services and establish an open 
dialogue.  As a result, civil-military relations within Chile are some of the most solid and 
comprehensive in Latin America.  In order to apply the trinity to the Chilean model it will 
be necessary to 1) analyze the events leading to Pinochet’s military regime and 
subsequent human rights violations committed by the military during his rule.  This is 
extremely important as one cannot understand the democratic transition without first 
understanding the events leading up to it.   2) Examine the military’s influence during the 
transition to democratic rule and civilian control.  The military’s influence on the 
transition itself forced the civilians to take their time and establish a dialogue with the 
armed services rather than stripping them of their power as is normally the case in Latin 
America.  This also forced the civilian leaders to become more knowledgeable on defense 
affairs in order to be able to interact with the armed services.  3) Determine the status of 
civil-military relations in Chile within the framework of the trinity of civil-military 
relations and compare its successes to another relatively successful country, Colombia.  
Although Chile is recognized as a success story in regards to its democratic transition, 
how will it measure up to the trinity of civil-military relations?  Prior to the 1973 coup, 
the civilian leaders were clueless about defense affairs, now they are among the most 
knowledgeable within the region.  Will this knowledge reinforce civilian control and 
prevent a repeat of 1973?  If the concept of the trinity is viable and Chile fits the model, 
than the answer will be yes.  However, if they do not fit the model but have not suffered a 
major crisis since 1990, it will be necessary to discard the trinity concept and look for 
other explanations for Chile’s success.   
6 
Colombia can also be regarded as a fairly successful example of civil-military 
relations.  However, upon closer examination, it becomes obvious the Colombia armed 
forces are very autonomous in their decision-making, much more than in Chile.  Chapter 
IV examines the Colombian structure and attempts to determine whether this autonomy is 
due to the military’s refusal or the civilian’s lack of defense knowledge.  Regardless of 
the findings in these two case studies, this research will provide further information on 
the viability of this new concept, provide a roadmap for the region as a whole and may 
alter United States engagement strategy in Latin America. 
7 
II. CHILE 
Civilian control of the armed forces has always been viewed as a requirement for 
a successful and stable democracy.  This is especially true in a region such as Latin 
America where coup d’etats seem to be the order of the day.  Harold Trinkunas states it 
bluntly: “stable democratic rule is impossible without civilian control of the military.”15  
Although it may seem like civilian control of the armed forces is being accomplished in 
Latin America, it is only happening on the surface.  As stated by David Pion-Berlin, 
civilian control of the armed forces has been achieved “without a fundamental knowledge 
of or interest in defense affairs.”16  This lack of knowledge and interest may actually 
serve as an obstacle to stable democratic rule throughout Latin America.  I believe 
civilians must have some knowledge of military affairs to achieve true civilian control of 
the armed forces.  This goes hand in hand with Thomas Bruneau’s statement “civilians 
must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are 
required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully 
fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to security forces 
in Latin America.”17  As a matter of fact, as Raúl Benítez Manaut states: 
the fundamental difference between the armed forces of a developed 
country and those of a developing country, is that the former are postured 
for defense against an external threat, while in the latter, in addition to 
external threats, the military undertakes missions within its own borders, 
whether that be to support the modernization process or to provide 
assistance in facets beyond the State’s capacity.18   
How do countries get to this point in their civil-military relations?  It is much 
easier for the civilian leadership to fall in line with the statement made by Pion-Berlin.  
Since no knowledge of military affairs is required, civilian leaders can do much the same 
as Carlos Menem did in Argentina when the military attempted to rebel in 1990.  He 
                                                 
15  Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela : A Comparative Perspective, 2 
16  Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America, 19 
17  Bruneau and Goetze, Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America, 67 
18  Raúl Benítez Manaut, "Las Relaciones Civiles-Militares En Una Democracia: Releyendo a Los 
Clásicos," Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1 (January - June, 2005), 166. 
8 
“reduced the size of the army by a third, abolished the draft, slashed the military budget 
(from 18.2 percent of total government expenditure in 1989 to 10.6 percent in 1993), and 
privatized military-owned enterprises.”19  This is one method of subordinating the 
military to civilian rule although it may not be the most effective method of bringing the 
armed forces under civilian control.  The steps undertaken by Chile during their 
democratic transition provide a more thorough and comprehensive method to 
subordinating the armed forces to civilian control.  
Among Latin American countries, Chile has probably enjoyed the most success in 
establishing true civilian control of the armed forces.  This feat did not happen overnight 
as it has taken sixteen years to get to the point Chile is at now.  This chapter will explain 
how Chile has arrived to this point in its transition.  I will provide a background 
concerning Chile’s coup d’etat in 1973 and the events that transpired during the 
seventeen year history of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime.  The second half of this 
chapter will cover the events that took place during Chile’s transition to democracy from 
1990 to 2006.  Specifically, I will focus on the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, also known as the Rettig Commission, and the Mesa de Diálogo.  I will 
also address the impact the appointment of General Juan Emilio Cheyre as Commander 
in Chief of the army and Pinochet’s arrest had on the armed forces’ willingness to 
subordinate themselves to civilian rule.  Finally, I will draw on his research and 
determine whether Chile’s experience can be duplicated elsewhere as well as provide 
some lessons learned which other countries may institute during their democratic 
transitions to subordinate the armed forces to civilian control. 
Chile has been relatively successful in establishing civilian control of the armed 
forces.  This accomplishment however, has not come easily.  It has taken sixteen years 
and although civil-military relations appear to be institutionalized, there is still some 
further progress to be made.  However, one cannot understand the challenges Chile has 
overcome in this lengthy process without understanding its history and the impact 
Augusto Pinochet had during his seventeen year rule.   
                                                 
19 Steven Levitsky, “Argentina: From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back),” in Jorge I. Domínguez and 
Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, Second ed. (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 250. 
9 
A. PINOCHET’S REGIME 
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte came to power as a result of the coup on 11 September 
1973.  However, he was not the principal architect of the plot and was not informed of 
the impending coup until three days prior to the coup itself.  Nevertheless, once he was 
informed of the plot he agreed to go along with it and took charge once the military junta 
was established.  The explanations offered for the coup range from the overthrowing the 
government of Salvador Allende, “the world’s first freely-elected Marxist Head of 
State”20 to “the claim that Chile was threatened by well-armed subversives.”21  In 1999, 
Rear Admiral Waghorn stated the following concerning the coup, “that day there was an 
action by the Armed Forces, that deposed a Marxist government that had been judged 
illegal by a majority of Chileans, as well as by the other State institutions.”22  Whatever 
the reasons for the coup, “from the day of the coup until well after Pinochet quit the 
presidency, Chile was a society ruled by fear.”23  Pinochet accomplished this through his 
use of the armed forces, the Carabineros, (the Chilean police force), and starting in the 
1974, through the use of the newly created Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA).  
The first indications of what was to come occurred shortly after the coup itself.  Pinochet 
instructed General Sergio Arellano Stark, a principal coup plotter, to lead a delegation of 
military personnel throughout Chile.  This delegation was to fly to various military 
garrisons and “dispose” of any leftist elements present in the prisons.  Starting September 
30 until the end of the tour on October 19, the delegation ordered or carried out the 
execution of at least seventy-two prisoners in what became know as the caravan of 
death.24  Many of these had turned themselves in shortly after the coup and were awaiting 
                                                 
20  Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Pinochet: The Politics of Torture (New York: New york University Press, 
2000), 59. 
21  Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 26-27. 
22  Alex Waghorn Jarpa, "Intervención Del Representante De La Armada De Chile En La Mesa De 
Diálogo Convocada Por El Sr. Ministro De Defensa Nacional, El Día 7 De Septiembre De 1999," Revista 
De Marina, no. 6 (1999). 
23  O'Shaughnessy, Pinochet: The Politics of Torture, 81 
24 For a detailed account of the events of the “Caravan of Death” see Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: 
Recovering the Truth, 39-44 
10 
trials and therefore possessed no threat to the government of the military junta.  However, 
this was in line in what would eventually become state policy.25   
The elimination of leftist elements became state policy with the formal creation in 
1974 of the Directorate for National Intelligence (DINA), an intelligence agency created 
to fight subversion and which answered directly to Pinochet himself.  Although DINA’s 
primary mission was stated as “establishing interrogation procedures, classifying 
prisoners, and coordinating intelligence functions,”26 its true mission was the elimination 
of the left.  The director of DINA was Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, “who apart 
form his wife and his mother was to be the person who had the most influence on 
Pinochet”27  and consisted primarily of army and carabinero officers.  The organization 
was responsible for the “detention and torture centres and clinics throughout the 
country.”28  The DINA, more than any other organization was responsible for the 
systematic detention and torture of tens of thousands of individuals as well as thousands 
of the disappeared.29  Pinochet also used the DINA to get rid of threats from abroad.  
These included General Carlos Prats, Bernardo Leighton, and Orlando Letelier.  The 
details on these assassinations can be found in Hugh O’Shaughnessy’s Pinochet: The 
Politics of Torture.  DINA’s most ambitious undertaking however, had to be Operation 
Condor.  Operation Condor was a “coordinating committee of apparatuses of state terror 
in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, and to a lesser extent in Bolivia and 
Brazil.”30  The purpose of this collaboration was to rid the southern cone of leftist 
elements in the 1970s and 1980s.  Pinochet dissolved the DINA in 1977 and established 
the National Center for Information (CNI), also briefly headed by Contreras.  Although 
the dissolution of DINA did not put an end to state terrorism under Pinochet, “it did 
                                                 
25  Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth, 45 
26  Ibid., 55  
27  O'Shaughnessy, Pinochet: The Politics of Torture, 64 
28  Ibid., 66 
29 The disappeared were those individuals who were taken by state agencies to never be seen or heard 
from again.  For more details on these events, again see Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the 
Truth, 280 as well as O'Shaughnessy, Pinochet: The Politics of Torture, 182 
30  Ibid., 104-105 
11 
coincide with a sharp fall off in the number of disappearances.”31  The CNI was 
eventually “disbanded upon the return of civilian government in 1990.”32  Contreras was 
arrested and sentenced by Chilean authorities in 1995 to seven years imprisonment for 
the assassination of Orlando Letelier. 
B. THE MOVE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
Despite the threat posed by the DINA/CNI and the repression of the Pinochet 
regime, Pinochet was voted out of office in the 1988 plebiscite.  However, this did not 
signify the end of Pinochet in Chilean politics.  Measures he had taken during his rule 
ensured he would remain relevant far beyond his seventeen years of reign.  The two 
biggest factors in ensuring Pinochet’s relevance after his rule were the Amnesty Law of 
1978 and the 1980 constitution.  The Amnesty Law of 1978 stated that “anyone who had 
committed a criminal act between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978 was granted 
amnesty.”33  The only individuals not covered by this law were those involved in the 
assassination of Orlando Letelier.  Despite the advances made by the democratic regimes 
since 1990, the Amnesty Law is still used today.  The 1980 constitution, drafted under 
Pinochet’s orders, provided powers that ensured he remained influential.  As illustrated 
by Ensalaco’s and O’Shaughnessy’s research, these included declaring 
unconstitutional and illicit groups advocating any doctrine that is 
totalitarian, is based on class struggle, promotes violence, or even ‘does 
harm to the family’; insulated senior military commanders from dismissal; 
established a National Security Council authorized to rebuke the president 
if he did not heed its warnings about threats to national security; the armed 
forces were guaranteed ten per cent of the sum earned from sales by 
Codelco, the state copper corporation; Pinochet continued as commander-
in-chief of the army and could not be removed; the military continued to 
have to answer only to military courts and not civilian ones, and created 
the position of senator-for-life which Pinochet occupied after ceding 
control of the army in 1998.34 
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These examples are a few of the “120 permanent articles and 29 transitional 
articles”35 introduced by the 1980 constitution.  Thus, through the Amnesty Law and the 
1980 constitution, Pinochet ensured the transition to democracy would proceed as he saw 
fit when he stepped down as President of Chile.  Finally, before stepping down, Pinochet 
made one final threat in a speech celebrating the sixteenth anniversary of his regime.  
During his speech, Pinochet advised the civilian politicians on acceptable behavior during 
the transition: 
Respect the constitutional functions granted to the armed forces, maintain 
the immovability of the service commanders, ensure the prestige of the 
military institution and its security from political attacks, prevent class 
struggle, fully apply the law against terrorism, respect the function of the 
National Security Council, uphold the amnesty law, refrain from meddling 
in defense policy, training instruction of military personnel, military 
jurisdiction, budgetary provisions, and the established system of 
promotions, retirements, and appointments.36 
As Marc Cooper stated in his book, Pinochet and Me, Pinochet “remained the 
single most important political presence in Chile”37 until his death on 10 December 2006.  
In essence, the Chilean military “stood at the epicenter of power, and largely dictated to 
its democratic successors what the limits and possibilities of the new competitive order 
would be.”38 
1. The Rettig Commission 
Against this backdrop the democratic transition started for Chile.  The first 
president of Chile after Pinochet stepped down was Patricio Aylwin Azócar, a member of 
the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia which “was formed to defeat Pinochet in 
the plebiscite.”39  Aylwin’s first order of business was to deal with the human right 
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abuses committed during the seventeen years of Pinochet’s rule.  He would have to walk 
a fine line, if he upset the military and Pinochet, they might take over the government; if 
he upset the victims of the human rights abuses by not seeking justice, the transition 
would be meaningless.  With this in mind, Aylwin set up the National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation on 24 April, 1990.  Aylwin selected a left-leaning attorney, 
Raúl Rettig Guissen to head the commission, for which the commission came to be 
known as the Rettig Commission.  The objectives of the commission as set forth by 
Aylwin were: 
to establish as complete a picture as possible of those grave events, as well 
as their antecedents and circumstances; to gather evidence that might 
make it possible to identify the victims by name and determine their fate 
or whereabouts; to recommend such measures of reparation and the 
restoration of people's good name as it regarded as just; and to recommend 
the legal and administrative measures which in its judgement should be 
adopted in order to prevent further grave human rights violations from 
being committed.40 
The overarching purpose of the commission was to get to the bottom of what went 
on during the Pinochet regime concerning human rights violations and establish once and 
for all that human rights violations did occur.  However, as noted by Ensalaco, the 
definition of human rights violations adhered to by the commission was in itself flawed.  
The definition as stated in the report was: 
situations of those persons who disappeared after arrest, who were 
executed, or who were tortured to death, in which the moral responsibility 
of the state is compromised by acts of its agents or persons in their service, 
as well as kidnappings and attempts on the life of persons committed by 
individuals for political reasons.41 
This definition defines acts committed by persons or agencies in the name of the 
state as human rights violations.  However, it also defines acts committed by individuals 
as human rights violations.  Essentially, any crime committed against agents of the state 
by private citizens would be considered human rights violations rather than common 
crimes.  The commission’s rationale for adhering to this broad definition was as follows: 
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in practice it has been observed that when the expression "human rights 
violations" is limited to government actions, public opinion very often 
tends to interpret it as an effort to condone or justify abuses or atrocities 
that may be committed by certain opposition political groups.  The idea 
that there are certain values of humane behavior that not only the state but 
all political actors must respect has become enshrined in the public 
conscience.42 
Regardless of the reasoning behind using the broader concept of human rights 
violations, this was in line with Aylwin’s strategy of being “cautious, non-
confrontational, and highly sensitive to political, legal and constitutional constraints”43 so 
as to not upset the armed forces and thereby jeopardize the democratic transition.  The 
rest of the commission members consisted of two human rights activists, Jaime Castillo 
Velasco and José Zalaquett Daher, center-right Laura Novoa Vásquez and rightist judge 
Ricardo Martín Díaz, as well as political moderates and Aylwin associates.  In addition to 
the objectives set forth by Aylwin, he also established some limitations on the 
commission, namely “he denied it the power to subpoena witnesses, he enjoined it from 
naming the culpable, and he limited the duration of its existence to less than one year.”44  
Although the reasons for imposing these limitations are based on constitutional rationale, 
the primary reason once again was the threat of the military.  However, the limitation to 
not name names was heavily influenced by José Zalaquett.  According to Ensalaco, 
although Zalaquett believed that in order for states to confront past abuses “the nature and 
extension of the violations committed should be disclosed, as well as how they were 
planned and executed, what is the fate of the victims, individually, who gave the orders 
and who carried them out,”45 a special commission of inquiry should not publish names.  
His reasoning for this was due to the fact that “such a body does not have prosecutorial 
powers, and if it names names, then some individuals may actually be signaled as culprits 
without having had the benefit of a proper defense.”46  President Aylwin agreed with  
 
                                                 
42  "Chile: Reports: Truth Commissions: Library & Links: U.S. Institute of Peace"  
43  Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth, 183 
44  Ibid., 188 
45  Ibid., 192 
46  Ibid., 192 
15 
Zalaquett that naming individuals could incriminate them without the benefit of legal 
representation and so the exclusion of names was included as a limitation for the 
commission.   
The limitation imposed on the commission served to make its investigations into 
abuses that much more difficult.  As it did not have the legal authority to demand 
documents or force unwilling witnesses to testify, the armed forces and police selectively 
turned over the documents they deemed necessary.47  In addition, the commission’s 
efforts were further hampered by the armed forces. “The halting cooperation of the 
military, and its deplorable silence on the fate and whereabouts of the arrested-
disappeared, combined to perpetuate the pattern of impunity through an official policy to 
cover-up evidence crucial to the work of the commission.”48  Besides hampering the 
Commissions efforts by their failure to cooperate, the armed forces also exerted pressure 
on the commission overtly as evidenced in December 1990, when Pinochet placed the 
Chilean armed forces on alert.  “Pinochet’s stunt was meant to convey the simple but 
ominous message that the possibility of military intervention was now part of operational 
doctrine.”49  Nevertheless, the commission was able to produce a report confirming the 
human rights violations thanks in large part to the evidence gathered by human rights 
organizations such as the Vicariate of Solidarity, the Chilean Human Rights Commission, 
and the Foundation for Social Assistance of the Christian Churches.  Along with the 
evidence gathered from the human rights organizations, the commission also sought 
witnesses of human rights violations.  It posted notices in local and foreign publications, 
alerting the public of its work and providing a ninety day limit to report violations.  When 
the commission started investigating cases in June 1990, they had 3400 cases of human 
rights violations.  The commission gathered further evidence through interviews of 
victims that were detained and later released as well as those who witnessed individuals 
being arrested and taken away.50  The commission also tried to gather more information 
from the armed forces but that proved next to impossible, especially where the army and 
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the Carabineros were concerned.  On the other hand, the investigations Police, 
International Police, the navy and the air force cooperated fully with the commission.  
The policy of the army and Carabineros to not cooperate with the commission or allow 
the military members to tell their side of the story is something the commission believes 
worked against both the army and the police.  As Raúl Rettig stated to Mark Ensalaco, “’I 
believe they committed an error that was very prejudicial to them, because many of those 
who had been publicly imputed, who for personal reasons went before the Commission, 
frequently received, at least, what you Americans call a reasonable doubt.’” 51  After all 
was said and done, the commission identified 2,115 victims of human rights violations.  
However, 642 cases were still undecided and as time passed, the total figure would rise.  
Although it was able to process a large number of cases, the commission did not 
accomplish what it set out to accomplish: “to identify all of the victims by name and to 
determine their fate and whereabouts.”52 
The commission delivered its completed report to Aylwin in February 1991.53  
President Aylwin made the report public in March.  The reaction and response to the 
report by the armed forces was not surprising.  The commanders of the armed forces 
delivered their response at a session of the National Security Council.  The army’s report 
stated “the army certainly sees no reason to seek pardon for having taken part in a 
patriotic labor.”54  Furthermore “the army’s response directly rejected ‘the wrong 
historical perspective of the Rettig Report’ and noted its ‘fundamental disagreement’ with 
the reports concepts and topics.”55  The navy’s response likewise blasted the report: “the 
‘truth’ which the report proclaims is nothing more than a simple opinion which may be 
shared or rejected.”56  The Carabineros dismissed the report as well stating, “given the 
real impossibility of establishing an absolute truth in relation to the presumed violations 
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of human rights in Chile between 1973 and 1990, we must understand that the work of 
the national Commission on Truth and Reconciliation was oriented to present a version of 
those events, and that, because it lacks any legal value, it in no way obliges its complete 
and total acceptance.”57  Of all the service’s Ensalaco states the air force’s response “was 
the most conciliatory.”58  The air force commander, Fernando Mattei, stated: 
I respect that we, the broad majority of Chileans, have acknowledged the 
effort of president Aylwin to seek the reconciliation that would permit 
Chile to project itself into a better future…I am convinced that only 
representative democracy, with its balance of powers and its full vigilance 
of the rule of law, offers guarantees that there will never again be repeated 
in Chile an experience such as the on described in the report.59 
The responses of all the services agreed on one aspect which they believe the 
report fails to address: the fact that all the services believed that “a state of war existed in 
Chile during the more than seventeen years of the dictatorship.”60  Regardless of what the 
armed forces believed, the findings of the Rettig Commission were public and there was 
no denying the fact that human rights violations were committed by the armed forces 
under Pinochet’s rule. 
2. The Corporation on Reparation and Reconciliation 
The Rettig commission was not able to identify all the victims of human rights 
abuses, however, as part of its final recommendations, it proposed standing up another 
agency to continue the investigation of past abuses.  President Aylwin complied with this 
recommendation and directed the formation of the Corporation on Reparation and 
Reconciliation.61  The Corporation’s primary mission was “to classify cases, and to find 
the disappeared and the executed”62 as well as to “implement the dozens of constructive 
recommendations for reform carefully drawn up by the Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission.”63  Although the Corporation came into existence in January of 1992, it did 
not really start working on cases until January 1993, when it finally received the archives 
from the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation.  From these archives, the Corporation 
started with 989 cases the Commission could not investigate.  Another 640 cases were 
added after a ninety day reporting period was provided for the public in much the same 
way the Rettig Commission had done.  However, due to the large amount of individuals 
coming forward, the Corporation had another 90 day period in which they added 562 
more cases.  All told, the Corporation ended up with approximately 2,119 cases, 1,210 of 
which were new and never seen by the Rettig Commission.  In its effort to classify cases, 
the Corporation faced the task of identifying the arrested-disappeared though to be dead 
and those who were known to be dead but whose body was never found.  With this in 
mind, by January 1994, the Corporation had to find the bodies of 1,553 Chileans, of 
which 1,118 were arrested-disappeared and only 435 were known to be dead.64  None of 
this resulted form assistance by the armed forces, however.  Four years into the 
democratic transition, the armed forces still refused to cooperate and hindered the 
investigations in whatever manner they could.  The Corporation for Reparation and 
Reconciliation went out of existence in 1994 still having unaccounted for thousands of 
disappeared during the Pinochet regime.65 
President Aylwin’s creation of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation and 
the Corporation on Reparation and Reconciliation were his attempts to appease both the 
victims of the human rights violations committed under the Pinochet regime and the 
armed forces; neither of which was happy with the results of either commission.  
Nevertheless, these were the first steps in confronting the past and dealing with the 
Chilean human rights legacy.  The fact the commissions were allowed to exist and 
publish their findings was an accomplishment itself.  However, the investigations into 
human rights abuses would not end their.  Aylwin was replaced by Eduardo Frei Ruiz-
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Tagle, who according to Hugh O’Shaughnessy, “was to remain as frightened of Pinochet 
as Aylwin had been – perhaps more.”66  As such, Frei followed the same cautious 
strategy Aylwin had followed during his four years as president.  Frei’s presidency 
differed from that of Aylwin in the manner which they approached the armed forces.  
Whereas the Aylwin administration had been somewhat confrontational with the armed 
forces, the Frei administration wanted to establish a “nontraumatic relationship between 
the armed forces and some parties of the Concertación.”67  Despite the better working 
relationship with the armed forces, the issue of human rights proceeded at the same pace 
as under the Aylwin administration.  However, a fundamental change was about to take 
place when Augusto Pinochet was arrested in England in 1998. 
3. The End of an Era: Pinochet’s Arrest 
Pinochet had traveled to the London Clinic in 1998 for surgery on a spinal hernia.  
While there, an arrest warrant was issued by Interpol on behalf of a Spanish judge, 
Baltasar Garzón.  Garzón had been investigating “the case of atrocities committed against 
Spanish citizens in Argentina during the military regime which seized power in 1976.”68  
Another judge, Manuel García Castellón had been investigating cases of Spaniards 
murdered or kidnapped in Chile.  He brought these to the attention of Garzón who took 
over the case as well.  Garzón and Juan Garcés, another Spaniard who was preparing the 
case against Pinochet, issued the warrant on 16 October 1998.69  The arrest of a former 
head of state, known to have committed human rights abuses set important precedents.  
Namely, that those who violated international conventions against torture were no longer 
free from prosecution outside their home country.  Additionally, the arrest “was a strong 
indication that the process of globalization, for so long confined to questions of  
international trade, the internet and the freedom of multinational companies to strike 
down barriers to their global activity, was about to be extended to other areas of life.”70  
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The reactions in Chile were mixed, as expected.  The Pinochet supporters condemned the 
arrest as interference in Chilean affairs while the Left and Human Rights groups saw his 
arrest as “an end to impunity.”71  Nevertheless, both sides eventually agreed that Pinochet 
should be brought back to Chile and tried in Chilean courts.  The government’s official 
stand stated that “despite existing obstacles, the ex-dictator should stand before Chilean 
tribunals and respond to specific accusations on human rights violations.”72  Pinochet’s 
503 days under arrest marked the beginning of the end of his legacy; “the artifice of 
impunity and unaccountability that he had carefully constructed over twenty years was 
dealt a shattering blow by his arrest, had begun to crumble during his stay in custody, and 
was now well on its way, irretrievably, to its end.”73  More importantly however, 
Pinochet’s arrest “provided an important catalyst for revitalizing human rights policy in 
Chile, moving away from impunity and toward a new determination to hold all Chileans 
accountable to the rule of law.”74  Without Pinochet’s arrest, a process like the Mesa de 
Diálogo (roundtable discussion) could never have been possible. 
4. La Mesa de Diálogo 
The Mesa was created under the direction of Minister of Defense Edmundo Pérez 
Yoma on 21 August 1999.  It would start under President Frei’s administration and 
present its findings to the new president, Ricardo Lagos Escobar.  The Mesa brought 
together representatives of the armed forces, religious leaders, members from the Left 
and the Right, and lawyers to discuss human rights, specifically to try and answer the 
questions concerning the locations of the disappeared and what happened to them.  Each 
side of the debate wanted something different out of the dialogues.  The armed forces 
hoped this dialogue would mark the end of the transition period while the government 
hoped “that the military could provide centralized information about the disappeared 
therefore ending the confusion created by the many different public bodies that had 
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looked for information previously.”75  All in all, there were nine sessions of the Mesa 
from 1999 to 2000.  In an effort to promote discussion about the location of the 
disappeared, President Lagos proposed legislation that would protect individuals who 
provided information about locations of disappeared.  Eventually, the armed forces would 
provide information on 200 disappearances of which 130 had been dumped in the sea, 
lake or rivers of Chile, and another twenty buried in a common grave. 76  Although this 
can be considered noteworthy, human rights groups were not happy with the results.  The 
dissatisfaction can be attributed to the fact that these cases related to the first year of the 
coup, before the methods of disappearance became more “sophisticated” under the 
systematic policy of forced disappearance under the DINA.  Furthermore, the information 
provided by the armed forces made the search for bodies harder rather than easier as 
demonstrated by the Cuesta Barriga case.  The initial information the navy had provided 
regarding bodies somewhere in Cuesta Barriga led workers on a wild goose chase.  After 
two weeks of digging and trying different areas within Cuesta Barriga, workers tried their 
luck in an old copper mine.  Once the navy confirmed that this indeed was the correct 
location of the bodies, the excavation proceeded and the bodies of Horacio Cepeda and 
Fernando Ortiz, arrested in 1976, were found. 77   
President Lagos informed the Chilean public of the Mesa’s findings in a televised 
speech on 7 January 2001 in which he stated “more than the number provided, what 
stands out is the recognition by the high command of the armed forces of the acceptance 
that Chile cannot look to the future without clearing the doubts of the past.”78  Although 
the Mesa de Diálogo did not provide the information on the thousands of disappeared, it 
did provide an important stepping stone for a change in attitude in the armed forces 
towards past human rights abuses as well as allowing them to abandon “their historically 
authoritarian posture, to generally support governmental policies, and [be] tolerant of 
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public debate on defense and military issues.”79  Despite the gestures of the armed forces 
during and after the Mesa de Diálogo, the true change in attitudes can be attributed to the 
appointment of General Juan Emilio Cheyre as commander-in-chief of the army. 
5. Embracing Democracy: General Juan Emilio Cheyre 
General Juan Emilio Cheyre succeeded General Ricardo Izurieta as commander-
in-chief of the army in March 2002.  Whereas General Izurieta maintained the army in a 
defensive posture concerning human rights investigations from 1998 – 2003, General 
Cheyre believed in a more cooperative effort with the state institutions and as such had 
the army offer more cooperation to human rights investigations.80  The importance of 
General Cheyre’s influence on the changing attitudes of the army cannot be overstated.  
Michelle Bachelet, the minister of defense from 7 January 2002 until 1 October 200481 
said as much in her address to the Primera Semana Iberoamerican Sobre Paz: “In Chile 
we have achieved a common vision between society and the armed forces, recently 
expressed magnificently by the commander-in-chief when he noted the values of his 
institution cannot nor should they be, different from society as a whole.”82  General 
Cheyre’s speech in November 2004 at the deactivation of the army’s Intelligence 
Battalion finally provided what many people were waiting for, an admission of the 
army’s guilt as an institution of human rights violations: “The Chilean army made the 
difficult but irreversible decision to assume responsibility as an institution for all the 
punishable and morally unacceptable acts of the past.”83  This speech and the acceptance 
of responsibility could have presented problems for General Cheyre had the army decided 
to contradict his statements.  However, as Claudio Fuentes Saavedra points out in his 
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book “La Transición de los Militares”, Gen Cheyre had to have a consensus before 
making those statements.  He had to have at least a sixty to seventy percent consensus 
from the army as well as face active and retired generals that initially criticized his 
efforts.  Ultimately, General Cheyre’s successful efforts in gaining a consensus paved the 
way for the army as an institution to take responsibility for past human rights abuses and 
to accept subordination to civilian leadership.  In this context, General Cheyre can be 
characterized as the general of the military transition in Chile.84 
6. The Transition Gains Momentum: Constitutional Reform 
The armed forces in 2004 were well on their way to accepting civilian supremacy 
over military matters, however, a large test presented itself with President Lagos’ 
proposal and subsequent approval of reforms to the 1980 constitution.  These reforms 
included charging all State agencies, not just the armed forces, with national security, 
making the National Security Council an advisory body and giving the President sole 
authority to convene the National Security Council, providing the President with the 
authority to remove the commanders-in-chief and the director general of the carabineros, 
removing the position of Senator-for-life from the Senate, doing away with the binomial 
electoral system and limiting presidential terms from six to four years.85  More 
importantly, once these reforms were enacted there was no reaction from the armed 
forces, especially noteworthy since the 1980 constitution was put in place by Pinochet to 
ensure the military maintained power in Chile.  The Amnesty Law of 1978 however, has 
not been removed.  The amnesty law provided amnesty for individuals who committed 
human rights violations between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978.  Although the 
courts are now prosecuting armed forces members for human rights abuses and the armed 
forces have taken responsibility for human rights abuses committed during the Pinochet 
regime, the amnesty law is still in use.  As recently as April 2006, Chilean Judge Victor 
Montiglio applied the Amnesty Law to the caravan of death case.  Judge Montiglio 
absolved General Sergio Arellano Stark of his part in the caravan of death due to his 
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“lack of participation in the acts being investigated.”86  Despite the advances made in 
prosecuting human rights abuses and subordinating the armed forces to civilian control, 
setbacks like the Amnesty Law continue to delay the democratic transition in Chile. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Chile’s democratic transition is unique in Latin America.  It may be one of the 
longest transitions, but it can probably be considered one of the most successful.  The 
question is, can other countries look to Chile’s experiences and apply them to their own?  
The answer is yes and no.  Each country’s transition is unique.  What works in one 
country may not work in another.  However, individual countries can gain a tremendous 
amount of knowledge by looking at the Chilean experience.   
First, Chile proved that new regimes have to face the past in order to move 
towards the future.  As a poster on the wall of the Foundation for Social Assistance of 
Christian Churches in Chile states, “a country that does not close the wounds of the past 
has neither a present nor a future.”87  The reasoning for this is two-fold; it allows the new 
regime to pursue justice for the victims of human rights abuses and allows the armed 
forces to purge its ranks of perpetrators of abuse thereby increasing its legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population.  Chile did this through its Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, the Corporation on Reparation and Reconciliation, and the Mesa de 
Diálogo.  Although these committees and dialogues did not produce the desired results, 
namely the names and locations of the disappeared, they served to open the dialogue 
between the new government and the armed forces.  Despite the armed forces lack of 
cooperation at the beginning of the transition, the fact that the armed forces provided 
additional information about disappeared during the Mesa provided evidence of the 
government’s growing influence over the armed forces. 
Second, the outgoing leader cannot be allowed to remain politically or militarily 
relevant, especially when the previous regime was responsible for human rights abuses.  
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Pinochet was the primary reason the transition in Chile has lasted as long as it has.  His 
constant presence posed a threat to the Aylwin and Frei administrations and as such 
provided for an extremely deliberate transition.  Likewise, the armed forces reflected the 
same defiant attitude of their military leader.  Had Pinochet been neutralized as a relevant 
actor in Chile’s democratic transition, the transition would have unfolded very 
differently.  However, this lengthy transition has had an unintended consequence.  It has 
allowed civilian authorities to interact more thoroughly with the armed forces.  Rather 
than just strip the armed forces of their strength and render them irrelevant as a fighting 
force, the interaction between civilians and military has resulted in a more professional 
force.  The forced interaction between the armed forces and civilian authorities has also 
made the civilians more knowledgeable on defense matters.  As Claudio Fuentes 
Saavedra points out, “one of the most significant changes since the reestablishment of 
democracy has been an interest by civilian authorities to accept the responsibility of 
defense as State policy in which the civilians have a say.”88   
Third, any constitutions drafted during the previous regime need to be reformed 
or thrown out and redone.  The 1980 constitution in Chile allowed Pinochet to remain 
relevant after he left power.  This was intentional as it was Pinochet who drafted the 
constitution and included measures which ensured he would remain a relevant actor in 
Chilean politics long after he stepped down as President.  It also included measures to 
ensure the armed forces would remain a viable force for years to come.   
Fourth, a military leader committed to truth and justice can steer the armed forces 
towards subordination to civilian authority.  General Cheyre was this individual during 
the transition.  His leadership of the army facilitated the investigations into human rights 
abuses.  His efforts to strike a consensus in the army and admit that the army as an 
institution was responsible for human rights abuses during Pinochet’s regime improved 
relations between the armed forces and civilian authorities and further solidified the 
increasing subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority.  There is an important 
distinction to be made about the Chilean transition.  Although Pinochet and the armed 
forces posed a threat at the start of the transition, there were no other threats present.  
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Unlike the maras of Central America or the insurgent groups like the F.A.R.C. and the 
A.U.C of Colombia, Chile had no persistent internal or viable external threat.89  The 
presence of either of these threats, would have made the transition that much more 
difficult.   
Among the four findings provided, none is more important than the other, they all 
have to be dealt with.  Human rights abuses may not be settled if the previous ruler is still 
relevant and impedes any investigations.  The previous ruler may be relevant only 
because a constitution drafted during his regime allows him to be relevant.  The armed 
forces may never submit to civilian control unless they are led by someone who 
understands the importance of civil-military relations within a democratic regime.  
Ideally, these issues would be dealt with simultaneously, allowing for a more thorough  
transition.  These findings are in no way a guarantee for success, however, with regards 
to the civil-military aspect of the democratic transition, they can provide a framework for 
a smoother transition. 
Among Latin American countries that have gone through a democratic transition 
after an authoritarian regime, Chile stands out as a unique case.  First and foremost, the 
democratic transition itself was dictated by the very person being replaced, Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte.  Likewise, the armed forces were in a position of strength at the start of 
the transition.  As Marc Cooper illustrates in his conversations with a former army 
captain, “This was the only transition in Latin America where the military came out not 
only untarnished, but downright virgin.”90  As stated earlier, it is imperative to 
understand the events leading up to the democratic transition.  The shadow cast on Chile 
by Pinochet and the armed forces is difficult to comprehend unless one understands what 
happened during Pinochet’s seventeen years in power.  With this knowledge, one can 
understand why the transition started under President Aylwin was much more fragile than 
other transitions throughout Latin America.  The constant threat of a military takeover 
was very real and Pinochet ensured it remained a constant threat with displays of 
mobilization when the civilian administration pursued actions deemed unnecessary by 
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Pinochet.  Furthermore, the cornerstone for a successful transition, civilian control of the 
armed forces, was for all intents and purpose, nonexistent.  Although Pinochet resigned 
as commander-in-chief in 1998, he still remained relevant in politics when he took his 
position as Senator-for-life as stipulated in his 1980 constitution.  However, as Raúl 
Benítez Manaut states, “the theoretical supremacy of civilian rule over the military is 
devalued when retired military members exercise civilian politics from the 
parliaments,”91 hence the lack of improvement in civilian control of the armed forces.  
Pinochet’s defiant attitude was reflected in the armed forces as well.  The armed forces 
whole-heartedly believed they were undertaking a “patriotic mission through the 1973 
coup.”92  Their belief that they answered to no one was reflected in their lack of 
cooperation during the investigations of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the 
Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation and the discussions of the Mesa de 
Diálogo.  Although they provided additional information concerning some disappeared 
during the Mesa, it was nowhere near the information needed to clear the thousands of 
names of the disappeared.  Despite this lack of cooperation, the interaction between the 
armed forces and the civilians forced a dialogue between the two which would benefit 
both in the long run. 
Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998 removed an obstacle of the democratic 
transition.  This was especially evident when charges against Pinochet started appearing 
for human rights abuses committed during his regime.  It was at this point that the 
Chilean transition picked up steam as evidenced by the increase in cases against military 
members responsible for human rights abuses.  However, not until General Cheyre took 
control of the army did the armed forces accept responsibility as an institution for the 
human rights abuses and further subordinate themselves to civilian control.  The biggest 
test for Chile’s civilian control of the armed forces came with the proposed reforms of the 
1980 constitution ratified during Pinochet’s rule.  The reforms ranged from doing away 
with the Senator-for-life post in the Senate to providing the President with the authority  
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to remove the commanders-in-chief and director general of the carabineros.  Once the 
reforms were enacted in 2005, there was little fanfare and no reaction from the armed 
forces, a good omen for the future. 
Finally, the deliberate pace of the transition had the unintended effect of laying 
the foundation for Bruneau’s trinity.  Once the politicians understood they would have to 
actively engage the armed forces through the various commissions and the Mesa de 
Diálogo, they took it upon themselves to become more knowledgeable on defense issues.  
The best way to avoid another military takeover was by understanding what the military 
was doing and why it was doing it.  Essentially, the politicians were following Bruneau’s 
suggestion, “they clearly must know something, and just as important, they must be 
aware of what they don’t know.”93  Chile now has a cadre of knowledgeable civilians on 
defense affairs.  The presence of these civilian officials – probably the most important 
aspect of the trinity – facilitates the adoption of the trinity and helps Chile in their efforts 
to strengthen their civil-military relations. 
The question remains: has Chile completed its democratic transition?  Claudio 
Fuentes, director of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in 
Santiago does not believe so.  According to Fuentes, Chile is currently in the third phase 
of the democratic transition.  This phase is referred to as the institutional phase with the 
first phase being political and the second being constitutional.  This phase entails a 
modernization of the defense decision-making process, professionalization of the military 
career, the allocation of resources, to include a system of evaluation of projects, 
acquisitions, industry and forecast, and the international role or the armed forces focusing 
on peace operations and strengthening mutual confidence measures.94  Additionally, as 
long as issues such as the Amnesty Law and the disappeared and past human rights 
abuses are not dealt with, I do not believe the transition can be closed.  The Amnesty Law 
is still being used to absolve individuals responsible for human rights 
abuses.Consequently, the whereabouts of those disappeared remain a mystery.  The 
Chilean democratic transition has been a success up to this point, more so than any other 
Latin American country, however, its human rights legacy remains a black spot on its                                                  
93  Bruneau and Goetze, Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America,  67 
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success and will remain a black spot until this issue is resolved.  Until that time comes, 
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III. COLOMBIA 
The Chilean case is a prime example of the successful application of the trinity or 
knowledge-based approach to civil-military relations.  As stated earlier, each country’s 
experience with civil-military relations is different.  Chile’s success cannot be translated 
into success in other Latin American countries without taking into account each 
individual country’s experiences.  However, a case can be made that the failure to follow 
a knowledge-based approach to civil-military relations as Chile has, can result in poor 
civil-military relations.  While Colombian civil-military relations seem to be successful 
on the surface, a closer look reveals a military that dictates its own budget and continues 
to make decisions with little to no input from civilian leadership. 
Colombia’s history differs from most Latin American countries in that it has not 
been ruled by a military dictatorship since the 1950s.  Although Colombia has not 
suffered the coups experienced by various countries throughout Latin America, they have 
been fighting a forty year old insurgency.  The fact the insurgency has lasted over forty 
years may well point at the military’s lack of a focused strategy to defeat the insurgency.  
Ideally, this would be an area in which civilian expertise would provide the military with 
its roles and missions and national strategy, thereby providing the armed forces a 
roadmap to accomplish these objectives.  Furthermore, it is very possible the lack of 
civilian oversight led to mismanagement of everything from the budget to military 
training.  Although this chapter will not focus on the insurgency, the insurgency can be 
used as an example of the civilian’s failure to provide the armed forces with clear cut 
roles and missions and the resources necessary to defeat the insurgency.  While not a 
complete failure of civil-military relations, I believe this approach will allow me to see 
the communication failures between the civilian and military officials.  However, it is 
very possible that Colombian civil-military relations are very robust but suffer due to the 
constant battles with insurgent forces.   Nevertheless, I believe that Colombia will be an 
example of what can happen when the standard set by Bruneau’s trinity of civil-military 
relations is not met. 
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A. POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 
Prior to examining Colombia and its civil-military relations, it is necessary to 
understand the current debate in the civil-military relations field between David Pion-
Berlin and Thomas Bruneau.  Pion-Berlin believes it is not necessary for Latin American 
politicians to have a working knowledge of military affairs.  According to Pion-Berlin, 
“what Latin America needs are civilians who can manage the military in political-, not 
defense-, oriented terms.”95  As Pion-Berlin points out, Latin America has historically 
been free of external threats.  As a result, “in the absence of war or the threat of war, 
there has been less demand for strong fighting machines as well as less demand for 
defense expertise among civilians.”96  This has promoted an environment in which 
“civilian leaders do not meddle in core military interests if the military observes similar 
rules about the government’s core interests.”97  While this has led to civilian control of 
the military throughout most of Latin America, it has resulted in a lack of defense 
knowledge among civilian politicians.  Especially since all matters relating to training, 
budgeting, roles and missions have been left to the military to decide.  This results in a 
vicious circle in which any civilian who attempts to become more knowledgeable about 
defense affairs and immerse themselves in defense planning face an uphill battle against 
the armed forces.  As Pion-Berlin points out, “without first establishing their defense 
credentials, and credibility, civilians who have intervened in this way have bred military 
antipathy rather than compliance.”98  Although this political management of the military 
can achieve civilian control of the armed forces, civilian politicians are putting their faith 
in the military’s “goodwill” to do what is right for the benefit of the country rather than 
for the military’s own benefit.  This is something the civilian politicians cannot 
counteract unless they know and understand what the armed forces are supposed to do. 
Thomas Bruneau’s trinity of civil-military relations strives to provide the 
framework necessary to prevent the armed forces from taking advantage of the civilian’s 
lack of knowledge concerning military affairs.  In addition to democratic civilian control,                                                  
95  Pion-Berlin, Political Management of the Military in Latin America, 19 
96  Ibid., 22 
97  Ibid., 29 
98  Ibid., 30 
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Bruneau’s trinity includes military effectiveness and efficiency.  Bruneau’s definition of 
effectiveness states “that the armed services and other security forces are able in fact to 
implement the roles and mission assigned to them by democratically elected civilians.”99  
Military efficiency “means that the roles and missions are achieved at the least possible 
cost in lives and resources.”100  As covered by Bruneau, in order to assign roles and 
missions to the military, civilian policy-makers need to understand the capabilities and 
shortfalls of their military forces.  Pion-Berlin however, disagrees that civilians need to 
have some military knowledge since “the decision of politicians to decide whether or not 
to employ the military in certain tasks is a pragmatic one, made on the basis of common 
sense and information.”101  Pion-Berlin uses examples of “famine relief in Argentina, 
development assistance in Ecuador, counter narcotic programs in Brazil and disaster 
relief in Honduras and Guatemala.”102  Although these examples were pragmatic political 
decisions, they ignored a basic tenet of military operations: whether or not the military 
forces were capable of performing the mission they have been tasked to accomplish.  
When the military is left to their devices to accomplish their own training, roles and 
missions without civilian direction, they will institute a program which they believe is 
necessary for the protection of the country or their continued existence as a military.  This 
does not always translate into famine or disaster relief or counter narcotics training.  As 
Bruneau points out, “the armed forces have traditionally been trained, equipped, and 
oriented towards traditional territorial defense; and not towards fighting guerillas.”103  If 
civilian officials do not understand or know what roles and missions the military is 
training for, the results could be disastrous when the civilians call upon the armed forces 
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to perform a mission they have not trained for.104  Hence Bruneau’s call for civilian 
officials to have some military knowledge in order to assign relevant roles and missions 
and understand what the military is capable of accomplishing.  Bruneau also identifies 
“four necessary sets of structures and processes…to deal with the different elements of 
the trinity.”105  These are the Ministry of Defense, legislatures, an “established 
mechanism for inter-agency communication and cooperation”106, and an intelligence 
system.  All of these institutions support some or all aspects of the trinity.  However, the 
question remains whether it is necessary for civilian officials to have some military 
knowledge to achieve control of the armed forces or whether the trinity provides a better 
framework to achieve a more highly developed level of civil-military relations.  If all that 
is required to achieve and maintain control of the armed forces are politically astute 
civilians what is the purpose of pursuing the trinity?  Will civil-military relations be 
better off with the framework proposed by Bruneau’s trinity?  This chapter aims to 
provide answers to these questions by examining civil-military relations in Colombia.  
While this author aims to prove that the failure to adhere to the trinity of civil-military 
relations has contributed to the never-ending internal conflicts in Colombia, it is possible 
that no amount of civilian control or oversight of the Colombian armed forces could have 
improved the situation within Colombia.  Should this prove to be the case, neither Pion-
Berlin’s political management argument nor Bruneau’s trinity argument can adequately 
explain why the Colombian armed forces have not been able to resolve Colombia’s 
internal conflicts despite civilian control of the armed forces.  One reason may be the 
endemic violence within Colombia.  “La Violencia” claimed anywhere from 250,000 to 
300,000 lives.  For better or worse, the armed forces have been and continue to be part of 
the violent culture.  The Colombian psyche and its impact on the armed forces is a topic 
for further research. 
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B. COLOMBIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Although Thomas Bruneau provides the four structures and processes necessary 
for the trinity, this chapter will not get into the details of these four structures in the 
Colombian example.  Due to Colombia’s history as one of the longest-standing 
democracies in Latin America, little has been written about Colombia with relation to 
civil-military relations.  As a result, there is very little literature available about the 
historical framework of Colombian civil-military relations.  As J. Mark Ruhl points out in 
1981, “few analysts have studied civil-military relations in the handful of nations where 
civilian government has persisted.”107  Despite this lack of literature, this chapter will 
attempt to provide a general overview of Colombian civil-military relations through the 
1980s and 1990s and concluding with President Alvaro Uribe’s administration.  
Despite Colombia’s reputation as one of the longest standing democracies in 
Latin America, Colombian history has been marked by violence.  Starting with the period 
from 1948 – 1963, know as La Violencia108, to the rise of narcotraffickers and to the 
formation of guerilla groups, Colombia has never known real peace.  Through most of La 
Violencia, “the armed forces were not a factor in calming the country as it descended into 
civil war.”109  However, it was the military, specifically General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
who took power in 1953 in an attempt to stop the violence.  Rojas only lasted four years, 
as the civilian politicians removed him from power and arranged a compromise to share 
power by creating the Frente Nacional.  Cynthia Watson describes Colombia as being in 
a perpetual state of siege since the end of the Frente Nacional in 1974.110  During this 
time, the armed forces attempted to enforce the “political stalemate” in Colombian 
politics.  However, as demonstrated by the military’s actions in 1984 and 1985, civilian 
control of the military left a lot to be desired.  When President Belisario Betancur Cuartas 
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decided to provide amnesty to left-wing armed groups, the “Colombian security forces, 
charged with the defence of the patria, were appalled that an amnesty had been 
approved.”111  Rather than fall in line behind the President, the military refused to believe 
that groups such as Acción Democrática-Movimiento 19 (ADM-19) and Unión Patriótica 
(UP) wanted to participate in the political process.  As a result, when M-19 guerillas 
seized the Palace of Justice in November 1985, “security forces charged the building and 
destroyed it, killing all the guerillas and civilians inside.”112  Furthermore, any former 
guerillas pardoned by the amnesty who tried to run for political office were assassinated.  
The actions of the armed forces in 1984 and 1985 as well as their failure to follow policy 
set by civilian politicians contributed to the ongoing internal conflict in Colombia.  
Guerilla groups that did not accept the amnesty proposal and witnessed what happened to 
members who did, no longer trusted the military or the Colombian government.  These 
actions also demonstrate the military’s “autonomy from civilian institutions…with little 
control from the national civilian authorities.”113   
Although the Colombian armed forces have held a “quiet, secondary position in 
society as Colombia struggled to constitute a nation-state in the territory it has occupied 
since Independence in the 1820s”114, their autonomy can be traced to the formation of the 
Frente Nacional.  As part of the compromise between Conservatives and Liberals to 
rotate power every four years, “the civilians would take care of government, including 
economic and social policy, and the military (including the police) would take care of 
national security and defence.”115  This agreement “granted substantial autonomy in 
prosecuting the war against Marxist insurgents.”116  However, the civilian politician’s 
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complete disassociation from security issues has resulted in the present lack of civilians 
with any knowledge of military affairs.  Furthermore, the military’s goal of defeating the 
guerilla groups has not materialized despite the military’s advantage in equipment and 
personnel.  Whether this is the result of an incompetent military or the lack of civilian 
direction is up for debate.  However, the politician’s neglect of all security issues left the 
military to its own devices in determining what is best for national security.  
Additionally, the lack of understanding concerning the military’s roles and missions 
resulted in civilian officials assigning police functions or non-traditional missions to a 
military attempting to fight an insurgent war.  Further reinforcing this point, William 
Avilés points out, “the reserved dominion of the armed forces is a consequence of 
civilian ‘capacity’ and ‘interest’ in military affairs.”117  The results of this lack of interest 
are obvious as Colombia continues to battle guerilla forces and the military remains 
largely autonomous from civilian control. 
While Colombian civil-military relations have improved in recent years, the 
military’s autonomy remains obvious.  Yet another example of this autonomy occurred 
after President Andrés Pastrana Arango’s announced his plan to negotiate peace with the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) and granted them a despeje in 
southern Central Colombia.  Although Pastrana announced this initiative in 1998, the 
armed forces did not take any action until 1999, when it became obvious the President 
was going to follow through on his promises to the FARC.  Rather than allow the entire 
cadre of Colombian generals to resign in protest, the Minister of Defense and ten officers 
took the fall.118  Nevertheless, the armed forces presented a clear message that they “did 
not believe they were wrong, or that their methods unsuccessful; they believed the 
president was reckless in making concessions to the armed left.”119  This example 
illustrates the continuing lack of communication between civilian politicians and the 
armed forces.  The lack of a unified national strategy hampers the armed forces’ mission 
to eliminate the insurgent forces while civilian officials continuously change policies 
with no regard for the armed forces’ mission. 
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C. COLOMBIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: WHERE ARE THE 
INSTITUTIONS? 
The military autonomy described above continues today in Colombia.  Despite the 
constitutional reforms in 1991 which “has been seen as a consolidation of the democratic 
regime, opening up the closed two-party system and promoting the broadening of 
political and social participation”120, the issue of military autonomy was not addressed.  
As Bruneau states, the 1958 “understanding with the military could have been 
renegotiated.”121  Whether the failure to address this issue was due to the fear of a coup 
d’etat or simply the lack of knowledge of what constitutes civilian control is unclear.  I 
believe the reason stems, once again, from the lack of knowledgeable civilians 
concerning security issues.  While politicians may believe civilian control is nothing 
more than being able to fire a general or have a civilian Minister of Defense, Douglas 
Porch stresses that “civilian control requires the effective coordination of all branches of 
government to participate in the oversight of budgeting, strategic and operational 
planning, intelligence, personnel actions (promotions, assignments, retirements), 
requirements generation and acquisition.”122  In essence, the legislative and executive 
branches should exercise oversight as well as provide roles and missions for the armed 
forces, something which Colombian politicians do not do. 
As mentioned previously, the lack of knowledgeable politicians is rooted in the 
1958 agreement between the politicians and the armed forces.  However, this lack of 
knowledge is receiving more attention, or so it seems under President Álvaro Uribe 
Vélez.  At the very least, Colombian politicians are beginning to admit the lack of 
knowledge as stated by Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director of the Division of 
Justice and Security in the National Department of Planning, “the problem is that there 
are very few people in Colombia who understand about defense and security issues.”123  
The extent of this lack of knowledge and disinterest among the politicians becomes 
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apparent when one takes a look at the institutions, which under Bruneau’s trinity should 
be responsible for control and oversight of the armed forces. 
D. THE COLOMBIAN CONGRESS: WHAT CONTROL? 
The Colombian Congress has oversight of the armed forces, but no real power.  
As Thomas Bruneau states, “the roles of the legislature in policy definition, budget 
development, and oversight are minimal.”124  The major problem however, stems from 
the fact the civilian politicians, to include the MOD, believe this is a good thing.  As 
Douglas Porch’s interview with Vice-Minister Andrés Penate in 2005 illustrated, 
“Congress has oversight, but not control.  That’s good.  Who would want an army run by 
Congress?”125  While this may seem unbelievable from the point of view of U.S. civil-
military relations, the major difference between the two countries is the defense expertise 
among civilian politicians.  The U.S. Congress usually makes decisions and understands 
the impact those decisions may have on the armed forces.  This is due in part to the 
availability of knowledgeable civilians on defense issues.  As has been reiterated in this 
chapter, Colombian civilian politicians lack this knowledge.  As a result, the Colombian 
armed forces do not want Congress making decisions about the military without 
understanding the full impact of those decisions.  I would venture to say we could have 
similar reactions in the United States should the roles be reversed.  Unfortunately, this 
results in a vicious circle with no resolution in sight.  The armed forces refuse to give up 
their autonomy and subordinate themselves fully to civilian rule which in turn limits the 
effort civilian politicians are willing to exert to become more knowledgeable on military 
affairs.  However, civilian politicians have not taken it upon themselves to become more 
knowledgeable in military affairs.  The fact military autonomy was not addressed in the 
1991 constitutional reforms represents a missed opportunity for civilians to take more 
control.  Thomas Bruneau believes had the civilian politicians taken a more active role at 
that time, “the military would be prepared to share more responsibility with civilian 
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agencies if the latter would be prepared and willing to do so.”126  Some within Colombia 
believe the Congress has sufficient power.  Among the powers exercised by Congress are 
the ability to censure the Minister of Defense, vote on bills promoted by the Minister, 
appointing the Superior Council of the Judiciary, approve promotions and transfers, albeit 
with the President’s concurrence, and approve the defense budget.  However, the 
budgetary oversight is more of a rubber stamp than a through review of the defense 
budget as is the case in the United States.  Bruneau illustrates the simplicity of 
congressional oversight: “It receives the defence budget on a Friday and acts on it the 
following Monday.”127  Insofar as military legislation is concerned, Congress has little 
input.  Although they vote on bills promoted by the Minister of Defense, any negotiations 
concerning military affairs are conducted with military input.  The influence of the 
military in legislation is so large “the vice minister of finance who was negotiating 
pension reform had to be changed because the military refused to negotiate with him.”128  
The enduring lack of understanding of military issues makes the Congress a non-player in 
civil-military relations.  Rather than subordinating the military to civilian control, 
Congress goes along with any military proposals with minimal interference.  
Consequently, “all national issues, including national security and defence, become 
virtually exclusive areas of executive power.”129 
E. THE COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: WHO 
CONTROLS WHAT? 
As demonstrated by the presidencies of Betancur and Pastrana, civil-military 
relations between the military and the executive have shown signs of strain.  However, 
under the current president, President Uribe, there has been “a marked improvement in 
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civil-military relations, at least as far as the presidency is concerned.”130  After Pastrana’s 
failed attempt to negotiate peace with the FARC, Uribe was elected on a law and order 
platform.  Although, some “write off Uribe as a right-wing populist who wields 
personalized power to the detriment of political institutionalization”131, no one can deny 
the improvements seen in Colombia since his election.  The fact Colombians can now 
travel on the roadways, something unheard of prior to his election132, has been one of the 
many successes which has allowed Uribe to change the constitution and be elected for a 
second term.  His popularity also stems from the fact “he also tackled long-held fears 
about the primacy of the security forces over the civilian government.”133  Although 
Colombia is much safer and civil-military relations have improved somewhat, “Uribe’s 
leadership style is a very personal one that has come at the price of institution building – 
the National Security Council seldom meets, while senior generals by-pass their civilian 
‘superiors’ in a largely toothless Ministry of Defense to deal directly with the  
president.”134  Unfortunately for the advancement of civil-military relations in Colombia, 
this relationship is a detriment and not an improvement of civil-military relations.  
According to Cynthia Watson, “the president is said to call military leaders directly 
regarding issues of interest to him.”135  Normally, this would be a job reserved for the 
Minister of Defense who in turn would brief the president on the status of operations or 
issues of interest to the president.  However, due to Congress’ ignorance on military 
affairs and Uribe’s leadership style, the president’s role has been enhanced.   But as 
Richard Goetze points out, “this undermines the Minister of Defense.  It undermines the 
military chain of command as well.  This damages the concept of civil-military                                                  
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relations.”136  Uribe’s hands-on approach raises concerns about what will happen when 
he leaves power in 2010.  With his direct involvement with military commanders and the 
lack of institution building, will Colombia revert to its pre-2002 state?  Stable civil-
military relations between the president and the military are good for the short term, but 
do nothing for the long term.  As long as Uribe continues to undermine the MOD and 
democratic institutions necessary for stable long-term civil-military relations, Colombia 
remains vulnerable to military influence throughout the political system. 
Although Colombia’s Ministry of Defense exists on paper, its real world 
performance leaves a lot to be desired; much of this is due to Uribe’s relationship with 
the military.  However, it is important to note the MOD has only been led by civilian 
ministers since 1991, a relatively short time considering the forty years prior most 
ministers were generals.  Although one of the goals of the ministry is to “maximize the 
effectiveness of the military to implement national policy and provide for the security of 
the nation”137, this has not been the case.  The MOD is viewed by the military as a 
necessary evil rather than an essential part of their chain of command.  Douglas Porch 
presents several reasons for the military’s dismissal of the MOD and the minister: a 
cultural divide between civilians and the military, the strength of the military as an 
institution, and the direct relationship the military enjoys with the President.138  Once 
again, the reasons presented here can be traced back to the 1958 agreement.  The cultural 
divide exists because the civilian politicians have not bothered with defense issues since 
1958.  This same indifference has been responsible for the military’s strengthening as an 
institution, especially since the conflicto has always been viewed as the sole 
responsibility of the military.139  Finally, Uribe’s insistence to deal with the military 
commanders directly has not helped strengthen the MOD.  The fact Uribe enjoys a good 
relationship with the military could be used to strengthen civil-military relations and 
especially to strengthen the MOD.  Should Uribe require his military commanders to go 
through the MOD to communicate with him, as is done in the U.S. and other advanced 
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democracies, it would go a long way towards institutionalizing the MOD.  More than 
likely, the armed forces would disagree with this requirement.  Nevertheless, I believe 
Uribe is strong enough to force this requirement upon the military.  However, to ease the 
military’s concerns about “taking orders” from young ministers and vice-ministers, 
Colombia has to educate its civilian politicians on military affairs.  Appointing specialists 
rather than experienced administrators would add instant credibility to the MOD thereby 
enhancing the standing of the MOD among the armed forces.  If not, “the MOD, both the 
organization and the minister himself, [will remain] largely formalistic, without actually 
exercising any power.”140  As it stands right now, the CCMR team’s research on the 
Colombian MOD in 2003 concluded, “that MOD personnel are under qualified, 
overworked, paid less than their counterparts in other ministries, and exhibit ‘levels of 
frustration and fatigue that approach dysfunction.”141 
F. COLOMBIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: TYING IT ALL 
TOGETHER 
This chapter has attempted to show the state of civil-military relations in 
Colombia.  Although they seem to be improving, it should be clear that civil-military 
relations are not where they need to be.  How does this translate into the political versus 
knowledge-based management issue?  Since 1958 it can be said the military has been 
politically managed.  The agreement to let the military take care of all security issues has 
stood for almost fifty years.  Yet in that time we have seen the rise and strengthening of 
the FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), the formation of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and the fall and rise of narcotraffickers; 
despite the military’s mission to defend the patria.  The fact the military has not been 
able to put an end to the insurgency is testament to what can happen when civilians show 
complete indifference to military affairs.  Although the political management of the 
armed forces allows the politicians to lay the blame on the military – especially since this 
is their area of expertise – it led to a dire security situation in which a law and order 
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candidate was able to win the presidency.  While I believe the military’s inability to 
formulate a consistent strategy has contributed to the current situation in Colombia, the 
lack of knowledgeable politicians on military affairs has been a detriment to civil-military 
relations and partly to blame for the current situation. 
Although the country has experienced over forty years conflict, a national security 
strategy was not formulated until Uribe’s administration.  While this is not an attempt by 
civilian politicians to define the roles and missions of the armed forces, it is a first step to 
making the military more effective, or at least more focused on the task at hand.  As 
Major General Juan Salcedo Lora (ret.) stated in an interview in 1999, “the national 
military strategy must thoroughly analyze the constant crisis within our country and 
redefine the roles and mission of the armed forces to better prioritize what they must 
do.”142  During the forty years of conflict, it has also become obvious that the civilians do 
not want to educate themselves on military affairs.  As a result the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the military has suffered.  While attempting to fight the insurgent forces, the 
Colombian armed forces have also been assigned a role in the war on drugs, normally a 
police function.  As Cynthia Watson points out, once politicians start tasking the military 
with non-traditional missions and “civilians are unable to accomplish their work, they 
gradually abdicate their tasks to the military, further imbalancing the fragile equilibrium 
between civilian and military players in society.”143  This raises serious questions for the 
future of the Colombian National police, especially if the military continues to conduct 
missions normally reserved for the police.   
Political management of the armed forces has not worked in Colombia.  Civil-
military relations are not where they should be.  The desire to let all military issues be 
handled by the military has backfired and resulted in the near collapse of the Colombian 
state.  Whether or not Colombia would have fared better using Bruneau’s trinity model is 
not certain.  If political management of the military was not successful, how can a model 
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which requires more effort from the civilian politicians alter civil-military relations?  If 
Colombia had followed this path starting in 1958 and strengthened the institutions 
required in the trinity, the Colombian political landscape may have looked very different.  
However, in order to get there now it is necessary to change the attitudes and the political 
system within Colombia.  Although Uribe has stabilized civil-military relations, this only 
applies to the relationship between the President and the armed forces.  The first step 
requires that Uribe break the relationship with the armed forces and empower his minister 
of defense and the MOD to exert control over the armed forces.  While the armed forces 
may believe they have the right and expertise to deal unilaterally with defense issues, 
forty years of conflict have shown their inability to present a unified strategy to deal with 
internal problems.  They have been neither effective nor efficient in waging a counter-
insurgent war.  Empowering the MOD with more control over planning, promotions, and 
budgets, to name a few, would provide the MOD with the credibility to lead the armed 
forces.  Likewise, involving the Congress in military issues is another necessary step to 
improve civil-military relations and approach the standard set by Bruneau’s trinity.  As 
illustrated in this chapter, congressional indifference has allowed the President to develop 
a personal relationship with the armed forces and removed Congress from the military 
decision-making chain.  This leaves oversight in the hands of the President since the 
MOD has no power, and as a result the military continues to dictate failed military 
strategy.  This however, is not the silver bullet that will fix Colombian civil-military 
relations or resolve the internal conflict.  Civil-military relations is one piece of a much 
larger problem in Colombia.   
Despite the political management model present in Colombia, the trinity does 
exist in Colombia, at least on paper.  The institutions required by Bruneau’s trinity are all 
there: the MOD, Congress, a stable executive branch, a strong military.  However, the 
existence of these institutions as pointed out in the preceding pages, does not guarantee 
good civil-military relations nor does it mean it will fulfill the requirements set forth by 
the trinity.  The Colombian case is missing what I consider to be the key component of 
Bruneau’s trinity: a pool of civilian politicians knowledgeable in defense issues.  
Comparing the Chilean and Colombian cases, they both have the same institutions, 
however, the effectiveness of the institutions in each country differs tremendously.  I 
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attribute this to the presence of defense savvy officials: Chile has them, Colombia does 
not.  Colombian politicians are starting to understand they cannot grant the armed forces 
carte blanche when it comes to defense issues.  Uribe is proof of the influence a politician 
can wield over the armed forces when they take time to understand what the armed forces 
are doing.  Developing a pool of defense savvy politicians will take time, however, there 
is no guarantee anything will change in Colombia once the politicians understand defense 
issues.  Nevertheless, all the pieces are in place as required by Bruneau’s trinity, the 
politicians are the missing piece.  They will determine the future direction of Colombian 
civil-military relations. 
Further research needs to be conducted into civil-military relations in Colombia 
and the civilian’s continued persistence to wash their hands of military affairs.  Pion-
Berlin’s assertion that there is no incentive to become knowledgeable in military 
affairs144 may be spot on, however, Uribe was elected on a law and order platform, of 
which the military is a big component.  If the security situation worsens and the 
population remains focused on security, it would benefit the politicians to become versed 
in military affairs.  However, as Douglas Porch states “so long as the military can keep 
Colombia’s insurgencies at arm’s length, and governments can play on U.S. fears of 
communists, terrorists or drugs to extract resources from Washington, the incentive for 
Colombians to carry out necessary reforms to put their own house in order is 
removed.”145  Political management has not and will not work in Colombia; it is time to 
push civil-military relations towards the trinity model and hope for the best.  Ultimately, 
regardless of which civil-military relations model Colombia favors, the civilian 
politicians are going to decide the fate of Colombia and its people, no matter what the 
armed forces believe.  
 
 
                                                 
144 Part of Pion-Berlin’s argument about political management centers around the lack of incentives to 
learn about defense issues in Latin America.  For the full argument, see Pion-Berlin, Political Management 
of the Military in Latin America, 19 and Pion-Berlin, The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A 
Reply to Thomas C. Bruneau, 51-62. 
145  Porch, Uribe's Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations in 
Colombia, 7 
47 
IV. THE TRINITY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Stable civil-military relations have always been considered a prerequisite for 
stable democratic governance.  As Harold Trinkunas states, “stable democratic rule is 
impossible without civilian control of the military.”146  Different countries achieve 
control of the military through various methods: reducing its budget, reducing the size of 
the military so it is no longer a threat, or eliminating the armed forces altogether.  
However, when a country no longer has a military strong enough to accomplish its 
primary mission – defense of the nation – what options do the politicians have when an 
unforeseen event occurs that threatens their existence?  While this scenario is unlikely to 
happen in regions like Latin America, the rise of populist leaders like Hugo Chavez 
brings this scenario closer to reality.  According to Chavez, Venezuela needs “a million 
well-armed men and women.”147  Venezuela has already spent four billion dollars to 
purchase “24 fighter jets and 30 transport and attack helicopters, and rifles”148 with plans 
for additional spending.  Venezuela’s military purchases increase the possibility, as slight 
as it might be, of an arms race on the Latin American continent.  Brazilian senator Jose 
Sarney referencing Venezuela’s purchase stated that "it is a [great] danger for Brazil and 
all of Latin America to have a military power in our continent."149   
Whether Chavez believes he is preparing his country against an armed invasion 
by the United States or is preparing to impose his will throughout Latin America, 
Venezuela represents a dilemma for Latin America.  Countries that have achieved stable 
civil-military relations through budgetary and military reductions will not be able to 
counter Chavez militarily.  This scenario, once thought impossible in Latin America, may 
very well play out in the next few years.  With the rise of populist leaders, terrorist safe 
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havens in the tri-border region and increased Latin American participation in peace-
support operations, it may be time for Latin American countries to shift away from 
control of the armed forces as the sole means of achieving stable civil-military relations.  
Thomas Bruneau’s trinity concept of civil-military relations may be the answer for an 
effective and efficient military prepared to accomplish its stated roles and missions yet 
remain subordinate to civilian rule. 
Chapter II and III of this thesis looked at civil-military relations in Chile and 
Colombia.  Chapter II was written to argue that Chile has strong and stable civil-military 
relations, possibly the best in Latin America.  The focus of Chapter II was primarily on 
how Chile managed to achieve control of the armed forces after Pinochet’s rule while 
also developing politicians with defense knowledge.  Chapter III focused on the 
Colombian military and the political structure.  Although Colombia is one of the longest 
standing democracies in Latin America and appears to have strong civil-military 
relations, closer inspection reveals a largely autonomous military, a lack of defense 
knowledge among the politicians, and a weak defense ministry.  What can account for the 
stark differences in civil-military relations between the two countries?  Is Bruneau’s 
trinity concept present in one country and not the other?  Does political management 
rather than knowledge based management lead to weak institutions and poor civil-
military relations?  This chapter attempts to answer these questions and provide an 
understanding of Bruneau’s trinity concept and whether it is the answer for stronger civil-
military relations throughout the world. 
A. THE ARGUMENT: POLITICAL BASED OR KNOWLEDGE BASED 
MANAGEMENT 
Prior to applying the trinity standard to the Chilean and Colombian cases and 
measuring its impact on civil-military relations, it is necessary to dissect the argument 
between political-based management and knowledge-based management of the armed 
forces.  Political management of the military “is a low-cost means of achieving a relative 
calm in civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, 
legislative oversight, and large budgets.”150  Rather than making decisions or appointing 
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officers based on improving the armed forces or the institutions or appointing the most 
qualified, decisions are based on keeping the military under civilian control regardless of 
the cost to the readiness of the armed forces and appointing those officers “with whom 
they are familiar, have known via political party or familial connections, or who they 
surmise will be loyal to them.”151  Under this type of management, “civilian leaders do 
not meddle in core military interests if the military observes similar rules about the 
government’s core interests.”152  While this is indeed an effective means of enforcing 
civilian control of military as demonstrated by Pion-Berlin,153 it has the potential to 
lower the readiness of the armed forces and render them incapable of accomplishing the 
roles and mission imposed on them by civilian politicians. 
Knowledge-based management of the military is more demanding of civilian 
politicians than political management.  Whereas politicians do not need to worry about 
understanding the ramifications of their decisions in a political management model, the 
knowledge-based management model requires that politicians have some understanding 
of defense issues to achieve stable civil-military relations.  As part of Bruneau’s trinity 
concept, civilian knowledge is a prerequisite to achieve stable civil-military relations: 
Civilians must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are 
doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to 
civilian control, but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide 
spectrum of roles and missions assigned to security forces in Latin 
America.154 
This clearly puts the onus on civilian politicians to understand and institute 
defense policy rather than allow the armed forces to dictate national defense policy.  This 
however, lies at the heart of the argument between political and knowledge-based 
management of the armed forces.  While both sides agree that “the balance of 
competence will still lie squarely in favor of the armed forces even with incremental 
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increases in civilian defense understandings”,155 Pion-Berlin believes the knowledge-
based management model will be difficult to institute in Latin America since “civilian 
politicians and average citizens do not have a proper set of incentives to invest time, 
resources and expertise into the defense realm.  As such, defense learning never becomes 
a national priority.”156  While this may have been true in the past, the rise of maras, 
organized crime, insurgencies, increased participation in peace support operations and the 
global war on terror present new opportunities for the election of defense savvy 
politicians.  One needs to look no further than Alvaro Uribe’s election in Colombia on a 
law and order platform to understand that circumstances determine the necessity for 
civilian politicians with some defense knowledge.  Furthermore, as Pion-Berlin states, “in 
democracies, it falls on civilian political leaders to plan for the defense of the state, and 
assign roles and missions to the armed forces to support this objective.”157  This is in line 
with Bruneau’s trinity concept which requires civilian politicians to understand defense 
issues in order to successfully meet the standards set forth by the trinity concept. 
B. THE TRINITY EXPLAINED 
The trinity of civil-military relations sets a new standard in the study of civil-
military relations.  Dr. Bruneau’s concept goes beyond civilian control of the armed 
forces; it also calls for an effective and an efficient military.  This is a broader view than 
that covered by the current literature in civil-military relations.  As Bruneau states, “the 
literature on civil-military relations (CMR) concentrates on civilian control of the armed 
forces, even where this control is not in question.”158  The focus on control in the civil-
military relations field has resulted in a limited understanding of why control of the 
armed forces works in some situations while in others it does not.  Pion-Berlin brings this 
issue to the forefront in Latin America: “Politician’s emphasis on civil-military power 
relations and coup prevention has masked the stark deficiencies in civilian attention to 
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defense policy across the region.”159  Bruneau further states that “control, despite the 
overwhelming focus in the literature, by itself does not provide a sufficient understanding 
of contemporary issues in civil-military relations.”160  The trinity concept is an attempt to 
fill this knowledge gap and provide a more comprehensive blueprint for stronger civil-
military relations. 
1. Democratic Civilian Control 
Control of the armed forces is the first pillar of Bruneau’s trinity.  This control 
however, is not the control achieved by politicians by reducing the military to the point it 
can no longer accomplish the missions assigned to it nor by cutting its budget as a means 
to limit its power.161  The control espoused by the trinity is that which is rooted in 
institutions.  According to Bruneau, democratic civilian control “is grounded in and 
exercised through institutions ranging from organic laws that empower the Ministry of 
Defense, oversight committees and executive bodies that direct police, to budget 
processes and civilian control of promotions within intelligence agencies.”162  Ideally, 
these institutions would be staffed primarily by civilians or else the idea of civilian 
control is moot.  This also goes in line with the previous discussion of knowledge-based 
management.  If the institutions are staffed by civilians who lack an understanding of 
defense policy, they will “shirk” their responsibilities and allow military personnel to 
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2. Effectiveness 
The second and third leg of the trinity is what prevents the complete reduction of 
the armed forces to a skeleton of its former self: “the effectiveness with which security 
forces fulfill their assigned roles and missions [and the] efficiency in the use of resources 
to fulfill the assigned roles and missions.”163  A more concise definition of effectiveness 
presented by Bruneau refers the military’s “ability to actually achieve stated goals.”164  
The biggest obstacle to the advancement of effectiveness and efficiency as an additional 
standard in civil-military relations is the difficulty in measuring the success of each one.  
Regardless of the field of study, effectiveness is always difficult to measure.  Within Air 
Force maintenance metrics are used to evaluate effectiveness with categories ranging 
from how many mission-capable aircraft are available to how many maintenance hours 
are required per every flight hour.  However, if the maintenance organization does not 
meet a stated maintenance goal for the month yet provides enough aircraft to meet all the 
flying organization’s training sorties, is the maintenance organization ineffective and 
unsuccessful?  In the eyes of the flying organization it would be considered successful 
since it met its requirements, yet the maintenance organization may see the same results 
as falling short of its goals and therefore unsuccessful.165  This example illustrates the 
difficulty in measuring effectiveness and success with something as tangible as aircraft 
maintenance.   
Effectiveness is much more difficult to measure in something as abstract as the 
armed forces effectiveness within the realm of civil-military relations.  The problem is 
compounded by the fact that some roles and missions of the armed forces are considered 
successful when nothing happens as is the case with deterrence.  As Bruneau points out, 
“there are the paradoxes of evaluating effectiveness in the context of deterrence, wherein 
wars are avoided precisely because a country is perceived no to be vulnerable.”166  The 
defeat of insurgencies is another difficult measure of effectiveness.  Was the insurgency 
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defeated by a superior military or by a comprehensive government social plan?  These 
examples demonstrate just how difficult it is to measure the effectiveness of the armed 
forces.  Nevertheless, Dr. Bruneau through his work at the CCMR, has outlined basic 
requirements for an effective military: the formulation of strategy, institutions to 
formulate strategy and implement it, and the commitment of resources to the armed 
forces in order to carry out its roles and mission.167  Ultimately, the best gauge of 
effectiveness may be a focus on “processes and not final results”168 and the lack of war, 
insurgencies, and crime. 
3. Efficiency 
Efficiency is even harder to gauge than effectiveness.  While efficiency in today’s 
military is widely understood as doing more with less - using the available resources in 
the most efficient manner in order to accomplish the mission - how does one measure that 
efficiency?  Although efficiency is the third leg of the trinity, Bruneau acknowledges the 
difficulty in measuring efficiency, “the conceptualization and measurement of efficiency 
in the area of security is extremely problematic.”169  In terms of budgetary efficiency, it 
is easy to measure how the armed forces are performing.  Are they purchasing less top-
of-the-line weapons when a larger amount of inferior weapons will allow them to 
perform their roles and missions just as effectively?  However, not everything is as easy 
to measure as budgetary spending.  According to the previous discussion about 
effectiveness, if a gauge of success is the lack of war, how do you measure the efficiency 
of the armed forces in achieving that success?  There is no obvious physical measurement 
to determine the military’s efficient use of resources to prevent war.  Nevertheless, as 
with effectiveness, institutions are key to measuring efficiency.  The difference however, 
lies in the types of institutions.  Whereas effectiveness is dealt with institutions that can 
formulate and implement strategy and policy, efficiency is best dealt with institutions of 
oversight.  According to Bruneau, “since the concept of efficiency is mainly about the use 
of resources, institutions must deal with the allocation and oversight of these 
                                                 
167 For the full discussion on effectiveness see Bruneau, Boraz and Matei, Towards A New 
Understanding of Civil-Military Relations  
168  Ibid., 23 
169  Ibid., 26 
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resources.”170  Rather than measuring efficiency, it may be easier to provide oversight 
thereby ensuring the armed forces use the resources available in the best manner 
available, especially since these resources will be provided by the state at the expense of 
other organizations and institutions.171 
Effectiveness and efficiency are at the heart of Bruneau’s trinity.  The previous 
discussions, especially where institutions are concerned, boil down to one thing: the 
presence of defense savvy civilians and politicians.  This does not mean civilians must 
become experts in defense, but that they need to have some knowledge of defense issues.  
In Dr. Bruneau’s words:  
They clearly must know something, and just as important, they must be 
aware of what they do not know, if they are to be successful in utilizing 
the armed forces and the more widely construed ‘security forces’ to the 
best advantage of their government and nation.172 
Without these knowledgeable civilians, the presence of institutions does not 
guarantee strong or stable civil-military relations as outlined by the trinity.  The question 
still remains however, does implementation of the trinity concept translate into stronger 
civil-military relations? 
C. THE TRINITY: APPLICATION IN THE REAL WORLD 
The case studies of Chile and Colombia attempt to answer this question.  Both 
countries have relatively successful civil-military relations but with very different 
approaches.  Both countries have the institutions required under Bruneau’s trinity and 
both have aspects of democratic civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency, however, 
the similarities end there.  The biggest difference between the countries rests in the 
presence of knowledgeable civilians concerning defense issues.  Writing about Chile’s 
democratic transition and the evolving relationship between the military and civilians, 
Marcos Robledo writes, “for the first time in Chilean history, civilian elites understood 
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they had an important role in, and assumed responsibility for, the formulation of defense 
and military policy.”173  On the other hand, Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara writing 
about Colombian civil-military relations notes, “the problem is that there are very few 
people in Colombia who understand about defense and security issues.”174  Although 
both countries have a Ministry of Defense, a capable military, a legislature tasked with 
oversight, among other institutions, the effectiveness of these institutions can be 
measured by the amount of knowledgeable civilians in the “system”.   
1. Chile 
The Chilean case study discussed in Chapter II provides an example of the 
successful implementation of Bruneau’s trinity.  While it is not perfect – the military still 
enjoys perks not present in mature democracies175 – it is the closest example of what the 
trinity can offer.  The Ministry of Defense formulates and implements defense policy 
while Congress oversees the budget, promotions, and retirements, among other issues.  
Unfortunately, while the Copper Law remains in effect, control of the military through 
budgetary oversight remains limited.  Chile’s true measure of civil-military relations will 
occur should Congress ever decide to repeal the Copper Law.  If the military “stays in the 
barracks” and does not offer heavy resistance, Chile’s civil-military relations are safe.   
The key to Chile’s successful implementation of Bruneau’s trinity is the presence 
of knowledgeable civilians on defense issues.  Chile, unlike Colombia, made a concerted 
effort to educate civilians concerning defense issues.  This however, was forced upon the 
politicians due to their experience with the Pinochet regime and the subsequent 
democratic transition.  In an effort to prevent the armed forces from coming to power 
again it was not enough to engage in coup prevention, especially since the armed forces 
dictated the pace of the democratic transition.  As discussed in Chapter II, the politicians 
were forced to become knowledgeable in defense issues in order to discuss defense with 
                                                 
173  Marcos Robledo, "Democratic Consolidation in Chilean Civil-Military Relations, 1990 - 2005" In 
Global Trends and their Impact on Civil-Military  Relations (Forthcoming), eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and 
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174  Douglas Porch, "Preserving Autonomy in Conflict - Civil-Military Relations in Colombia" 
(Unpublished Manuscript) 
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the armed forces.  Furthermore, if civilian politicians “must be aware of what they do not 
know”,176 they need to understand the roles and missions of the armed forces and how 
they are able to accomplish those roles and missions.  The deliberate pace of the 
democratic transition allowed the politicians to become knowledgeable on defense issues 
and develop a professional cadre that also understood defense issues.  Although the 
Chilean armed forces are not yet completely under civilian control, the politicians and 
civilians are making concerted efforts to become better educated and establish stronger 
civil-military relations.  If the civilian politicians are able to meet the requirements of 
Bruneau’s trinity, they will enjoy better civil-military relations and a more effective and 
efficient military. 
2. Colombia 
As discussed in Chapter III, congressional oversight of the military budget is 
oversight in name only and which many civilians believe should not meddle in defense 
issues.  The Ministry of Defense is undermined by the President and has no real power in 
directing, formulating or instituting defense policy.  Any defense policy that comes from 
the Ministry of Defense is heavily influenced by military inputs.  On paper, Colombia 
appears to meet all the requirements for Bruneau’s trinity.  However as illustrated in 
Chapter III, the Colombian military remains largely autonomous with minimal 
interference from civilian politicians.  The biggest indicator Colombian civil-military 
relations do not meet the requirements set forth by the trinity is the almost forty year old 
insurgency.  While this thesis did not directly address the insurgency as a by-product of 
poor civil-military relations, further research may establish a link between the continuing 
insurgency and poor civil-military relations.  As it stands, while the Colombian military 
believes the spigot of U.S. aid will remain open, there is no incentive to be neither 
effective nor efficient in their fight against the insurgency.  Furthermore, the problem is 
compounded by a toothless Congress and Ministry of Defense.  With better oversight, 
more democratic civilian control and the threat of dwindling aid, the Colombian armed 
forces would be forced to find more efficient ways of dealing with the insurgency, which 
in turn would lead to a better implementation of Bruneau’s trinity. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The trinity is the new standard for civil-military relations.  Although it raises the 
bar for what constitutes strong civil-military relations, it forces civilians and politicians to 
take a hard look at their armed forces and institutions.  Both Pion-Berlin and Bruneau 
agree that civilians need to have some understanding of defense issues.  However, Pion-
Berlin does not believe Latin American politicians have the necessary incentives to invest 
time and effort into an area that does not translate into votes.177  While this may true, it is 
necessary to find alternative reasons or incentives for Latin American politicians to 
concern themselves with defense issues.  The threat of terrorism and trans-national gangs 
presents a problem which Latin America will have to deal with whether they are prepared 
or not.   
The problem of improving civil-military relations to the trinity’s standard is not as 
overwhelming as it may seem.  The majority of countries in Latin America have some 
form of control over their armed forces.  The next step entails educating a cadre of 
civilians on defense issues to improve that control and develop a more efficient and 
effective military able to participate in peace-support operations, the war on terror, 
coalitions and internal security.  Additionally, improved civil-military relations helps 
strengthen developing democracies. 
How to develop a defense savvy civilian cadre presents another problem.  The 
two case studies discussed in this thesis both seem to have implemented the trinity yet 
upon closer examination this it not the case.  As discussed throughout this thesis, the 
major difference is the presence of knowledgeable civilians in defense issues.  Although 
each country is unique, Chile offers a possible method to educate civilians.  Many Latin 
American countries have suffered through some form of military dictatorship.  Those 
countries still trying to transition from the dictatorship to democracy can benefit from 
Chile’s experience.  A deliberate and methodical transition with civilians and military 
officials actively engaged in discussions will help develop a defense savvy cadre.  The 
availability of these civilians will make the implementation of the trinity much easier.  
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Chile’s experience is by no means the correct method to develop knowledgeable 
civilians.  However, countries experiencing the same types of issues as Chile did may 
benefit from their experience.  Regardless of how each country decides to develop 
defense savvy civilians, the key is to develop this cadre whatever the cost.   
Knowledge-based management of the armed forces is a better method than 
political management to control the armed forces.  Decisions based on defense 
knowledge rather than opportunism are normally better for the military and the country in 
general.  Political decisions on the other hand, are normally made with no regard for 
military interests and can result in increased military hostility, despite democratic 
control.178 
The trinity in itself is not perfect.  Bruneau admits that effectiveness and 
efficiency are difficult to measure.  Should Latin American politicians be persuaded to 
take an interest in defense issues, the biggest obstacle for the implementation of the 
trinity is the difficulty in measuring effectiveness and efficiency.  Although Dr. Bruneau 
provides measures for effectiveness and efficiency,179 the trinity concept is still a fairly 
new idea and as such requires more development.  Nevertheless, the trinity should be the 
ultimate goal of developing democracies.  If the trinity becomes the accepted standard for 
civil-military relations, it could go a long way towards institutionalizing democracy 
throughout Latin America. 
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